



DTM Update

RWG, 18 February 2019

Latest DTM Data: Jan-Feb 2019 (Round 108)



Returns



4,211,982
Individuals



701,997
Families

- In Round 108 (January-February) DTM recorded an extra 46,662 returnees, mostly to Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Anbar.
 - So slightly less than Round 107, when 51,696 new returnees were recorded (Total returnees 107: 4, 165, 320)
- 130,824 returnees are living in critical shelter, 3% of the total returnee population
 - Also slightly less than Round 107, when 132,744 returnees were living in critical shelter

Return Index

Return Index: Latest Publications

- The *Return Index Report Round #2* and the *Thematic Series Brief #1: The Physical and Social Dimensions of Housing in Conflict-Affected Areas* were both published last week.

HOTSPOTS OF OVERALL HIGH SEVERITY CONDITIONS:

- Sinjar Centre (Ninewa)
- Baiji Centre (Salah al-Din)
- Ramadi peri-urban areas (Anbar)

HOTSPOTS OF HIGH SEVERITY LIVELIHOODS AND BASIC SERVICES CONDITIONS:

- West Mosul (Ninewa)
- Al-Abassy (Kirkuk)
- Saadiya and Jalawla (Diyala)

HOTSPOTS OF HIGH SEVERITY SOCIAL COHESION AND SAFETY PERCEPTIONS CONDITIONS:

- Tooz Khormatu District (Salah al-Din)
- Telafar Centre (Ninewa)
- Zummar and Ayadhiya (Ninewa)



Return Index 2.0: Update

We are now recalibrating the model, 6 months after the first data collection and after adding new previously inaccessible locations (Baaj, Ayadhiya, Tooz Khormatu...)

The results, overall, did not change a lot—what was relevant before is still relevant now around the same magnitude.

This means that the context in terms of obstacles to return remains similar and that the functioning of the RI is going to be the same: a score for two scales that will let us classify locations into different levels of severity and identify hot areas.



Return Index 2.0: A sneak peak at indicators

Preliminary indicator analysis shows that

- Housing destruction remains the most impactful factor, in addition to access to primary schooling (which is more important, than before).
- The indicator on need for reconciliation is also showing a higher impact now than before
- New question on agriculture has some impact on returns in rural areas
- The new added questions about access to employment and access to basic items (rather than presence of market) has an impact
- New question on blocked return was (unsurprisingly) significant
- Similarly, # of security actors in a location, as well as who is controlling the checkpoints, is still very significant
- Return of public servant and presence of big businesses is only applicable to a few locations and has no impact on returns
- Access to primary health care (and by default to hospital) shows no impact on returns; only a handful of locations reported not being able to access healthcare, even when there is no facility in the location
- Access to justice offices does not impact returns

Protracted Displacement: Top 32 Districts



Stationary vs Dynamic Top 32 Districts

- The number of displaced households between March and December 2018 was compared and the rate of change between periods are computed
- The variability of displacement, i.e. districts where displaced households are not or very slowly moving out of their location of displacement could be rated as “stationary”, while districts where families are moving out at a faster pace can be rated as “dynamic”.
- **Evidence from previous ILAs suggests that it is often the more vulnerable that are left behind, as permanence in displacement is linked to difficult conditions** - i.e. they have lost everything back home and/or have no means to return, hence the conditions of current IDPs may be worse off than those portrayed in back when ILA III was collected.

Top 32: Stationary vs Dynamic Districts

Mobility	Districts	% of IDPs (107)
Stationary Rate of change between -10% and +10%	KRI: Akre, Dahuk, Sumel, Zakho in Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah Ninewa: Mosul and Sinjar Diyala: Ba'quba, Khanaqin Falluja (Anbar), Al-Musayab (Babylon), Tooz (Salah Al-Din)	61%
Fairly Stationary Rate of change between +10% and +20%	Salah Al-Din: Al-Fares, Balad and Samarra Kirkuk: Daquq, Kirkuk KRI: Al-Shikhan (Dahuk), Kalar (Sulaymaniyah) Diwaniya (Qadissiya)	17%
Fairly Dynamic Rate of change between +20% and +30%	Kerbala Tilkaif (Ninewa) and Chamchamal (Sulaymaniyah)	3%
Dynamic Rate of change above +30%	Baghdad: Abu Ghraib, Adhamia and Karkh Kifri (in Diyala), Najaf, Ramadi (Anbar), Telafar (Ninewa), and Tikrit (Salah-al-Din)	9%

Stationary Districts

- The 13 stationary districts host the majority of displaced households (66%, and 84% with fairly stationary).
- Despite a prevalent intention to return at long term, IDPs in stationary districts are **the most likely to remain in the next 12 months**, confirming the presence of severe obstacles to their return – such as the destruction of former residences; the lack of HLP documentation and fear due to the ethno-religious change at origin (40% versus 7% in dynamic districts).
- Lack of security at the location of origin was also widely reported, both by IDPs in stationary and in fairly stationary districts.
 - IDPs in fairly stationary districts, who were the most likely to report lack of security at origin (70%) as well as obstructed returns (31%).
- It should also be noted that – although infrequent - IDPs in stationary districts were the only one to report the issue of their former houses being inhabited (3%).

Dynamic Districts

- The 8 dynamic districts host only 10% of displaced households (and 13% with fairly dynamic).
- IDPs' intentions at long term are largely similar to the average, with the majority planning to return. **The difference is more marked at medium term – with nearly half either leaning towards return or undecided and 55% – confirming the greater dynamism of these districts.**
- In general outflows can be linked to the lower level of residential damage and the better security of IDPs' locations of origin. The most prevalent obstacle to return is **lack of job opportunities.**
- However, outflows do not match with voluntary– and successful – returns in all cases. IDPs in dynamic districts were more likely to report pushed returns (especially in Abu Ghraib and Adhamia, in Baghdad) as well as evictions compared to IDPs in stationary districts.



A Note about Intra-District Displacement

- 9 districts – accounting for about 30% of IDPs, the majority in Mosul- were found with high rates of intra-district displacement.
- These districts are Al-Musayab in Babylon; Mosul, Sinjar, Tilkaif and Telafar in Ninewa; Tooz and Balad in Salah-al-Din; Khanaqin in Diyala and Daquq in Kirkuk.
- All districts but 2 belong to the stationary or fairly stationary categories and 6 have high severity scores in the Return Index (especially for scale 2), indicating the presence of severe obstacles to return: families are very close to their location of origin, return is their prevalent intention at long term and yet only very few have returned since spring 2018.



A Note about Intra-District Displacement

- The majority of locations of these districts have been either attacked or occupied by ISIL. This might help explain the higher likelihood in experiencing community tensions, including fear of revenge or retaliatory acts, that may prevent some groups from returning.
 - Evidence of high discrimination rates was found in Al-Musayab, Ba'quba, Balad, and Sinjar. These districts are highly polarized in terms of ethno-religious diversity within or surrounding them. Thus, while open conflict or violence may not be taking place, hostilities or tensions between communities is considerably noticeable.
 - Evidence of fear of ethno-religious change in place of origin was found in Daquq, Sinjar Telafar, Tooz, and to a lesser extent, Tilkaif, Mosul and Khanaqin
 - Evidence of obstructed returns was assessed in Al-Musayab, Khanaqin, Telafar, and to a lesser extent, Tilkaif and Tooz.